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Abstract 
This research study explores the framing of gender by Sweden’s right-wing populist party, 
the Sweden Democrats over time. It uses qualitative text analysis and frame theory with the 
aim to analyze how the party has constructed diagnostic (problems) and prognostic 
(solutions) frames in regards to gender in their official party literature over the last 29 years, 
between 1989 to 2018 – with a focus on how this may have changed over time. I argue that 
the problems the Swedish Democrats identify and the solutions that they propose have 
changed significantly over this period. While two decades ago the party stressed a return to 
traditional gender roles and values, today it makes two kinds of appeals that are in tension 
with one another. The problems of today emphasize gender equality as being under threat 
from a religious and cultural “other” and, at the same time, is going too far. 
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Introduction 
The resurgence of right-wing populist parties continues to be a significant political 
phenomena in contemporary European democracies. Today, almost every European country 
has their own right-wing populist party, and whereas only one in hundred Europeans voted 
for these parties in the early 1980s, the average electoral support in Europe has increased to 
15.4 % in 2018 (Timbro, 2019:19) marking a transformation from the political fringe to 
become well-established parties in the political system.  
 The unifying factor among right-wing populist parties is their anti-immigration 
stances, rooting in ethno-nationalism and nativism (Pelinka, 2013; Wodak, 2019; Rydberg, 
2017). These parties are also often characterized as having a traditional and conservative 
stance on gender, morality, and family values. However, in the last 15 years, this 
characterization has become contested. Some of these parties, especially in Western Europe, 
seems to have softened their positions on traditionalism and converged to more mainstream 
positions on women’s rights (Lancaster, 2019; Akkerman, 2015).  
This trend is also evident in Sweden, where the right-wing populist party the Sweden 
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) has transformed from a extreme right-wing environment 
with traditional family values to currently stressing the importance of gender equality. The 
aim of this study is to understand how their framing of gender has developed over time. 
Therefore, the question to be answered is the following: 
- How and in which ways are gender framed by the right-wing populist party the 
Sweden Democrats, and how has it changed over time?  
I will be arguing, that the Sweden Democrats has considerably shifted their framing of 
gender. By identifying the construction of frames regarding gender, this study shows the 
party shifting from emphasizing traditionalism and morality in its first ten years, but from the 
2010s moving towards the framing of stressing frames connected to gender equality as 
something that needs to be protected from the threat of the cultural “other” but also as having 
“gone too far.”  
This study contributes to understanding the transformation the Sweden Democrats over a 
significant period when the party has moved from the fringe into the Swedish parliament with 
a focus on gender has had from a gendered perspective. Gender as a concept for this study is 
expanded later on but generally refers to "the behavioral, social, and psychological 
characteristics of men and women as well as the socially constructed roles, behaviors, 
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activities, and attributes within a cultural and social context" (Nihel, 2017:47). Previous 
studies have examined the Sweden Democrats’ framing of ethnic nationalism over time 
(Elgenius & Rydgren 2018) and also the party’s gender ideology and rhetoric (Towns, 
Karlsson & Eyre, 2014; Mulinari, 2016; Norocel, 2013), but there is to date no study 
recording of the transformation over time. I will also contextualize these findings and identify 
a shift that is part of a broader trend among West European right-wing populist parties, where 
the previous emphasis on traditionalism has softened. 
I use qualitative text analysis to examine the Sweden Democrats’ official party literature 
from 1989 until 2018, with frame theory as an analytical framework. Frame theory provides 
the analytical tool to examine the construction of diagnostic and prognostic framing, 
problems and solutions, in regards to gender. Official party literature includes here party 
programs and election manifestos over the period 1989 -2018, making all material directly 
representative of the ideology of the Sweden Democrats. By analyzing official party literature 
from the establishment of the party until the last parliamentary election in 2018, this study 
will examine and compare the changes in framing over time. 
Outline 
The rest of this study is divided into the following sections. In the background, I explore the 
rise of the Sweden Democrats, from its roots in Nazism to its current more moderate form. I 
also sketch and contextualize how gender-related issues have been treated by Sweden’s 
society and government since the 1960s. In previous research, I survey research on right-
wing populism especially in Western Europe and explore the positions and appeals of right-
wing populist parties with particular reference to previous studies of the Sweden Democrats 
on gender. The theoretical framework of frame theory is presented subsequently. I then move 
to research design in the methodology section and present the data I have analyzed for this 
study. Thereafter follows the presentation of findings and analysis thereof. In the last section, 
I present my conclusions that the Sweden Democrats framing of problems and solutions 
regarding gender has changed over time, and suggests areas for future research. 
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Background 
In this section, two key aspects of relevance for this study is presented. Firstly, the historical 
background of right-wing populism in Sweden and the Sweden Democrats rise to power, and 
secondly a brief outline of how Sweden historically has treated gender-related issues. 
The Rise of the Swedish Democrats 
Sweden has had several parties labeled extremists, dating back at least 90 years. Most of 
them were described as disruptive, and/or openly Nazi parties and movements (Widfeldt, 
2008). However, these parties and movements never saw real electoral success and were 
always pretty insignificant to Swedish politics as a whole (Rydgren, 2002:33). Anders 
Widfeldt (2008:266-267) identifies the resurgence of racist and neo-Nazi parties in the 1980s, 
arguing that these groups were more aggressive and, in some ways, more efficient than their 
predecessors. Two well-known examples of these parties and movements were Bevara 
Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) and Vitt Ariskt Motstånd (White Aryan 
Resistance). These groups were not around for an extended amount of time but became well-
known in a time where extreme-right views and racist activity increased in Sweden. While 
these extremist groups were making an indent, right-wing populist parties were still on the 
sideline of Swedish politics. Another party active during this time was Framstegspartiet 
(Progress Party), starting as a party with ambitions to unify the right parties, but quickly 
became a populist 'discontent' party that never broke through onto the national political stage.  
In 1986, the Keep Sweden Swedish (BSS) and the Progress Party merged into 
Sverigepartiet (Sweden Party). Initially highly active, internal conflicts made the party split in 
1987. In 1988, the more organized BSS fraction took control of the party and renamed it the 
Sweden Democrats (Rydgren, 2002:33). Individuals from the extreme right joined the party, 
many of whom were either convicted felons and/or Nazi-sympathizers. This serious image 
problem kept the Sweden Democrats on the sideline of Swedish politics for years, only 
winning a few local seats (Widfeldt, 2008; Erlingsson, Vernby & Öhrvall, 2014). However, 
the Sweden Democrats were able to consolidate its party organization and made strides to 
clean up their political image. In 1995, they elected a new party leader without a criminal 
record, and the party's share of criminals and Nazis started to decline. The elections of 1998 
and 2002 showed slow but consistent progress. In 2002, the Sweden Democrats increased the 
number of local seats six-fold and got 1.6 % of the vote in the national election, and increased 
to 2.6 % in the following election of 2006. In 2005, Jimmie Åkesson, active in the 
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organization since 1997, took over the position as the party leader and has remained in that 
role ever since (Widfeldt, 2008:267-270). The Sweden Democrats of today have modernized 
and repackaged the rhetoric to widen its electoral base. The nostalgia for the 1930s is gone 
(Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019:589), and they have removed controversial policy proposals such 
as the death penalty, ban of foreign adoptions, and ideas of racial purity. Instead, messages of 
the Sweden Democrats' commitment to universal human rights and gender equality are now 
presented (Towns et al., 2014:237). Despite its extremist origin, the party today have 
converged ideologically with its sister parties in both Denmark and Finland, by adopting 
similar party names indicating a nationalist position and an authoritarian stance in 
sociocultural policy combined with a relative centrist position on socioeconomic policies 
(Jungar & Jupskås, 2014:216). 
The electoral breakthrough came in the national election of 2010 when the Sweden 
Democrats received 5.7 % of the vote and won seats in parliament. In the national election of 
2014, the party doubled its electoral support and received 12.9 % of the vote (Elgenius & 
Rydgren, 2019:589). In 2018, the Sweden Democrats electoral support increased again to 
17.53 % of the vote (Valmyndigheten, 2020). Since 2014, the Sweden Democrats have been 
the third biggest party in Sweden. In recent polls made in both 2019 and 2020, the Sweden 
Democrats were predicted to be the biggest party in Sweden with estimates around 24 % of 
the electoral vote (Svt, 2020; Aftonbladet, 2019), even though these estimates have decreased 
in recent months to around 19.9 % in the wake of the current pandemic (Omni, 2020). 
Therefore, it is evident that the Sweden Democrats have gone from a party on the fringe to 
well-established within the Swedish political system. The Sweden Democrats have had low 
female electoral support, but this gap seems to be decreasing. While men still constitute the 
majority of their electoral base, more and more women are voting for them: and the gap has 
decreased from 74.2 % of men and 25.8 % of women in 2010 (Valmyndigheten, 2010) to 
69.9 % of the men and 30.1 % women in 2018 (Valmyndigheten 2018).  
The Swedish Context 
To be able to examine the Sweden Democrats through their construction of problems and 
solutions, I offer a brief outline of the Swedish context regarding gender-related issues. 
Sweden is part of the Nordic welfare regime, which has been conceptualized as a “women-
friendly” welfare state. Since the late 1960s, Swedish policies have aimed at increasing 
gender equality in both public and private life, and most Swedes hold egalitarian gender role 
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attitudes (Oláh & Gähler, 2014:578). Currently, Sweden is ranking among the most gender-
equal countries around the globe, with almost equal political representation as well as 
participation in the labor market. Since 1995, Sweden has also designated days set for each 
parent, so-called “daddy days," to provide incentives for men to take out more parental leave 
(Förädrapenning Info, 2012). However, Sweden still has a gender-segregated labor market. 
Women still take on the majority of the paternal leave and work in the home, work more part-
time than men, and consequently are on average paid less than men. These inequalities 
continue into retirement, with women’s pensions on average lower than men’s (Towns et al., 
2014:242). This is the Swedish context in which the Sweden Democrats respond to gender 
differences and gender inequalities. The following section presents the previous research 
regarding right-wing populism in Western Europe and previous findings regarding the 
Sweden Democrats gender ideology and rhetoric.  
Previous Research 
 
In this section, I outline the key defining features of right-wing populism and the previous 
literature regarding right-wing populist parties in Europe to understand recent changes in the 
rhetoric used by right-wing populist parties relevant to this study. I then continue to present 
the literature regarding the Sweden Democrats and gender to locate earlier findings within the 
field.  
Right-wing Populist Parties 
The definition of the phenomenon of right-wing populist parties is a contested issue, and 
many different names for these parties exist (far-right, extreme right, nationalist, radical right 
populist). Jens Rydberg (2017:1-2) states that he refers to these parties as radical right, where 
the uniting factor is ethnic nationalism. The main objective is to secure the majority culture of 
their state and keep it as culturally and ethnically homogenous as possible. This ethnic 
nationalism often takes the form of the exclusion of immigrants, and in some cases, also other 
minorities within the state. The foundation of ethnic nationalism makes the restriction of 
immigration, especially Muslim immigration, the center of the rhetoric for these parties. 
According to Rydberg (2017:2), it is misleading to refer to these parties as solely "populist," 
when it is the ethnic nationalism that is the dominant feature that, in turn, influences the 
radical right parties’ populist rhetoric.  
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Anton Pelinka (2013:5) provides a similar understanding using the term of right-wing 
populist parties. He states that right-wing populism in particular always has the component of 
being directed against an ethnically, nationally, or religiously defined “other,” being ethno-
nationalistic in its core (Pelinka, 2013:5). A common factor in the ideology of right-wing 
populist parties is nativism, referring to the notion that only those of the native group should 
inhabit the nation. In contrast, the non-native individuals, as well as non-native ideas, are a 
threat to the homogenous nation (Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge, & De Lange, 2015:8).  
 Pelinka also emphasize populism as a unifying factor among these parties. He defines 
populism as “a general protest against the checks and balances introduced to prevent ‘the 
peoples’ direct rule.” (Pelinka, 2013:3). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017:9) emphasizes 
populism as a defining feature of this party group and present a similar definition in three key 
assumptions; “the opposition between ‘the people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’; second, a 
grounding in the volonté générale (general will) of the people; third, its character as a thin 
ideology, because it does not constitute a coherent structure of beliefs but assembles 
contradictory ideologies in an eclectic fashion.” Modern populism understands democracy as 
government by the people – even though there is no clear distinction of which groups 
constitute “the people.” Instead, the notion of “the people” is often ambiguous and 
proclaimed as self-evident by populists. Right-wing populist parties, in particular, tend to 
present some ethnic/religious/linguistic/political minority as a scapegoat for current issues 
and create a narrative where this minority is a threat to "the people." (Wodak, 2013:25).  
While I agree with Rydgren (2017) that these parties cannot be defined as solely 
“populist,” I argue that excluding its populistic traits distinct for this party family minimizes 
the way these parties are using a populist rhetoric to achieve their ethnic nationalistic aims. I 
refer to these parties as right-wing populist parties. As Pelinka (2013) argues, these parties 
unify in ethnic nationalism, nativism, and pursue these objectives with a right-wing populist 
rhetoric. Therefore, this study refers to these parties as right-wing populist parties, unified in 
their populist messaging based on ethnic nationalism and nativism. 
 
The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and their Relationship to Gender 
Since the "Third-Wave" of right-wing populism slowly emerged almost four decades ago, 
these parties have become well-established in Europe and are electorally the most successful 
new European party family since the Second World War (Mudde, 2012:4). The causes for 
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this rise are well debated, but it is mostly allocated as a reaction against the broader structural 
changes in Europe during the late twentieth century. With mainstream parties converging into 
an integration consensus (Mudde, 2019), and socio-political changes mainstreaming issues 
such as women’s liberation, multiculturalism, and sexual liberation (Lancaster, 2019), right-
wing populist parties was established to stifle these political changes. Furthermore, the 
economic uncertainty in the wakes of the Eurozone crisis and the increased immigration to 
Europe from Northern Africa and the Middle East during the so-called migration crisis 
(Lynch, 2019:2), is identified as further triggering this rise, with support for right-wing 
populist parties rising in the aftermath of these turbulent events. While a more detail account 
of the causes of the rise of right-wing populism is outside the scope of this study, it provides 
context of how these parties have resurfaced in contemporary Europe. 
The impact of these parties differs across Europe. In Eastern Europe, there are 
examples of right-wing populist parties steering countries into authoritarianism. For example, 
the right-wing populist parties in Hungary and Poland have diminished checks and balances 
within the democratic system ever since they came into government (Wodak, 2019:196). In 
Western Europe, the impact and development have been different. The democratic systems 
have remained intact, with attempts to undermine the counterbalance between political 
institutions unsuccessful (Halikiopoulou, 2018:64). However, they all unite in the core 
political issue of pursuing policies of anti-immigration, especially towards Muslim 
immigration (Wodak, 2013:58).  
In regards to these parties’ positions on gender and gender-related issues, however, 
their stances and rhetoric differ across Europe. Eleonore Kofman even argued over two 
decades ago that "there is not a single and consistent attitude to the family and its social 
relations among Far Right movements" (1998:91). Cas Mudde (2007:96) explains this 
relatively diverse stance regarding gender-related issues on the fact that gender is a secondary 
issue for right-wing populist parties instrumentalized mainly for their overall nativist 
objectives. However, more recent studies shows that even though the positions differ across 
Europe, where are still common characteristics and trends of importance.  
In many post-communist countries, these parties have constructed an enemy in the 
concept of “gender ideology” which encompasses an overall liberal agenda with issues such 
as reproductive rights, gender studies, and LGBTQ-rights (Kovats, 2018:529). These right-
wing populist parties remain conservative and mobilized against “foreign” values of gender 
equality, instead stressing the importance of traditional family values and Christianity 
(Grzebalska & Pető, 2018:165). While any further investigation regarding the development in 
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Central- and Eastern Europe is outside the aim of this study, it shows the diversity in how 
right-wing populist parties have positioned themselves in their gender rhetoric.  
In Western Europe, the right-wing populist parties that have gained the most electoral 
success have adopted less extreme rhetoric and stressed the importance of "liberal values." 
These parties justify exclusionary policies on the ideological basis of national belonging, 
such as culture and values, instead of a racial basis of national belonging. This refinement 
have made these parties appear more legitimate, democratic, and align with basic national 
values (Halikiopoulou, Mock & Vasilopoulou, 2013:111).  
Other scholar’s explain this transformation in terms of “civilizationalism.” Roger 
Brubaker (2017) argues that right-wing populism in Western Europe form a distinct cluster 
by pitting "the people" against the "other" in broader civilizational terms. This cluster, 
striking in Scandinavia, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland, centers 
around the perceived "civilizational threat" of Islam. These parties have repositioned 
themselves in the last 15 years, stressing how Islam threatens national values they did not 
previously address, such as gender equality, gay rights, secularism, and freedom of speech. 
These parties are still nationalists, but the notion of "the nation" is reshaped in civilizational 
terms to create "the people" and the dangerous "other." (Brubaker 2017:1198). Furthermore, 
Caroline Lancaster (2019:13-14) argues that conservative values regarding gender, sexuality, 
and morality, has lost its salience in the last 15 years among many right-wing populist parties 
in Western Europe. Instead, they are converging to mainstream values of women’s and 
LGBTQ-rights, while maintaining anti-immigration as the core political issue. 
In brief, whereas right-wing populism remain united in their stances regarding anti-
immigration, they diverge in regards to gender-related issues. However, not so diverse that 
some current pattern cannot be detected. While Eastern European parties, in many cases, have 
rejected women’s rights and other liberal values as “foreign” intrusion, Western Europe seem 
to have embraced them and created a new dichotomy between national liberal values and the 
threat from the cultural “other.” These findings in Western Europe, in particular, provide a 
better understanding of the shift in gender rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats, as a part of the 
larger party family.  
The Sweden Democrats and their relationship to Gender 
The purpose of this section is to investigate previous studies examining the Sweden 
Democrats gender rhetoric. In the case of the Sweden Democrats, previous studies on their 
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relationship with gender-related issues have yielded varied results and ambiguity. Diana 
Mulinari (2016) examination of official party documents between 2008-2014 identifies that 
gender and gender equality are not given a significant amount of space in the material. Her 
findings show that the Sweden Democrats emphasize the biological differences between men 
and women, the preference to traditional family values, and the control of women’s 
reproductive rights for the survival of the nation. Cristian Norocel (2013:17) identify a 
similar narrative in speeches made by the party leader of the Sweden Democrats, were 
heteronormative couplings and limitations to abortions are important to ensure “Swedish 
offspring.” Furthermore, the party is seen as strongly anti-feminist and have a great difficulty 
addressing the issue of gender equality (Mulinari, 2016).  
These findings are in line with broader characteristics identified within the party 
family as a whole. Mudde (2007:92-95) identifies a few common features in right-wing 
populist parties gender ideology; the presentation of women's politics as family politics, the 
defense of the "natural differences between the sexes," anti-feminist notions condemning 
“extremists” wanting to diminish these “natural differences, and the notion that women as the 
only sex that can give birth need protection for the survival of the nation in their role as 
“housewives and mothers.”  
However, other studies identify a more complex picture of the party. Ann Towns, 
Erika Karlsson, and Joshua Eyre (2014:245) exemplify in their study of the Sweden 
Democrats gender ideology between 2010-2012 that the party is struggling with two 
competing nationalistic gender views. The first view presents gender equality as a Swedish 
national value in need of protection from the misogynic other, while the second view stresses 
the “natural” differences between the sexes and traditional gender roles with women as 
nurturing mothers and men as "warriors." This competing gender narratives makes their 
gender rhetoric contradictory, fiercely criticizing gender equality while emphasizing its 
importance regarding immigration and multiculturalism. They show how immigration is 
presented as a primary threat to women, with sexual harassment and violence as a primary 
example, and argues that immigrant women are oppressed victims of their misogynic heritage 
with examples such as honor culture, female mutilation, and the full-covered veil. The party 
also argues that this heritage from the “other” is allowed to continue instead of enforcing 
assimilation to Swedish gender-equality culture (Towns et al., 2014:244).  
This instrumentalization of gender equality regarding immigration is evident in other 
right-wing populist parties. Tjitske Akkerman and Anniken Hagelund (2007:197) registered a 
shift in rhetoric early on regarding gender and gender equality among right-wing populist 
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parties' in Western democracies. They identified that some right-wing populist parties 
presented gender equality as a part of the liberal, humanitarian, and enlightened tradition of 
European society, that ultimately needs protection from its cultural antagonist, the backward-
thinking, patriarchal, Muslim societies. In this way, gender equality was instrumentalized as a 
fundamental value in these European societies as something in need of protection from the 
"pre-modern Other" through stricter immigration policies and more focus on assimilation 
(Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007:212-213). Wodak (2015:174) also emphasizes that these 
parties, in Western Europe and Scandinavia in particular, have positioned the discourse 
regarding gender and gender equality as a conflict of values between civilized defenders of 
gender equality and the “barbaric” other that is oppressing women. The veiled woman, 
especially the burqa-wearing woman, has become the "other" representing the perceived 
dangers of Islam on “European civilization.” 
Sweden seems to fit into a broader trend in Western Europe, where gender equality in 
recent years have been instrumentalized to present the dangers of immigration and the 
“other,” exemplified as threatening national liberal values, native women, and oppressive of 
immigrant women. However, Benjamin Moffitt argues that these parties treat gender equality 
more so as a goal they have already achieved, which allows these parties to claim to be for 
gender equality, but at the same time criticize further measures aimed at combat gender 
inequality. If gender equality is presented as already achieved, then any additional measures 
are instead "the elite," forcing women and men to be the same, which is perceived as a form 
of discrimination by many of these parties (Moffitt, 2017:115). Comparatively, however, 
Sweden still seem to stand out. An expert survey on 15 right-wing populist parties identified 
the Sweden Democrats among the two most “liberal” gender ideologies in Western Europe 
(Campbell and Erzeel, 2018), expressing progressive views on gender and LGBTQ-rights.  
This section has shown that the gender ideology of the Sweden Democrats is 
somewhat ambiguous, including rhetoric both in line with a more traditional view of gender-
related issues as well as stressing the importance of gender equality. The next section 
introduces frame theory and the motivation behind using this framework. 
Theoretical Framing 
Below, I outline frame theory and sketch out its previous usage among the literature on social 
movements and of right-wing populism. I then continue to motivate why frame theory is 
appropriate for the aim of this study.  
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Frame Theory  
A frame is an interpretative schemata that help to make sense of the “world out there” (Snow 
& Bedford 1992:137). The framing of an issue is basically to “select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text” (Entman, 1993:52). 
Frame theory aim to conceptualize the way social movements "assign meaning to and 
interpret, relevant events and conditions that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.” (Snow & Bedford, 
1988:198). According to this framework, frames are produced by social movements and 
political parties, providing a foundation for individuals to locate their rationale and actions. 
Frames function both as a way of attribution and articulation (Elgenius & Rydgren, 
2019:586).  
In diagnostic framing, they identify individuals, groups, or structures as the cause of a 
perceived issue, and can attribute the blame of the problem unto this particular group. In 
motivational framing, they present justification and reasons for voters and activists to support 
their political cause. By proposing a solution or a course of action to deal with the perceived 
problem, political parties provide prognostic framing (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019:586). As 
any collective actor, right-wing populist parties need to motivate individuals to action and 
provide rationales for followers and potential followers to support their party. In doing so, 
framing processes allows political parties to define the self and its opponents, constructing an 
“us” and “them.” (Caiani & Della Porta, 2011:182).  
Previously, right-wing populist parties have constructed several anti-immigration 
frames, such as the frame of immigrants as a significant cause of criminality or other kinds of 
social insecurity, or the frame of Muslim immigrants as a threat against their countries’ 
liberal values (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019:584). Regarding the framing of gender, frame 
analysis among the Austrian right-wing populist parties show emphasis on “traditional family 
values” such as women’s right to stay at home but also arguing against immigration of the 
basis of gender equality due to Muslims misogynic “culture” (Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer, 
2014:250).  
This study uses frame theory as an analytical tool to examine the right-wing populist 
party the Sweden Democrats. As Gabriella Elgenius and Jens Rydgren (2018:584) argues, 
while the concept of ideology is perceived as a more coherent all-encompassing structure of 
political beliefs, frames are more specific and more strategically used by different types of 
political actors. Frames are neither inherently stable or always used in a coherent way, which 
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allows this study to examine possible inconsistencies and changes of problems and solutions 
over time. Furthermore, frame theory provides a framework to understand how political 
parties strategically construct the representation and image of their party. Since this study 
aims to understand better how the Sweden Democrats have constructed their rhetoric 
regarding gender over time, frame theory is a well-suited analytical tool. This study focuses 
on the diagnostic and prognostic framing, examining closer the representation of problems 
related to gender, as well as the construction of solutions. In the following section, I outline 
the design and methodology of this study, as well as the chosen empirical material for the 
analysis. 
Method 
In this section, I present the research design and chosen method of this study. I also outline 
the material chosen and the motivation behind the selection. I then continue to sketch out how 
the concept of gender is operationalized in this study to achieve appropriate validity and 
reliability will also be discussed. 
Research Design and Case selection 
This is a comparative case study that aims at analyzing the Sweden Democrats framing of 
problems and solutions regarding gender over time, that is, over almost 30 years since the 
establishment of the party. A qualitative method is preferable since the focus of the study is 
to examine the phenomenon in depth to detect nuances and shifts in framing over time. In 
terms of the method for data collection, qualitative text analysis is well suited for this study, 
since it provides the opportunity to examine the official framing of the party over time.  
The Swedish right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats, is of interest in view 
that Sweden until the late 2000s seemed immune to a successful right-wing populist party 
(Widfeldt, 2008:265). Nevertheless, the Sweden Democrats developed from being viewed by 
the vast majority of voters as politically and morally illegitimate (Elgenius & Rydgren, 
2019:589) to become a well-established political party. The Sweden Democrats is a party that 
has risen from the political fringe at the end of the 1980s to being the third biggest party in 
parliament. The Sweden Democrats have adapted and modified their rhetoric and to attract 
more voters. This strategy seems to have worked since the party has continued to increase its 
electoral support since 2005. As previous literature has shown, the refinement of party 
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rhetoric has included modification on gender as well (Town et al., 2014). However, previous 
studies also show how this gender rhetoric is both ambiguous and at times contradictory. 
Earlier contributions of the Sweden Democrats gender ideology has focused on a specific set 
of years (Towns et al., 2014; Norocel, 2012; Mulinari, 2016), which cannot fully account for 
the development of the party in their rhetoric regarding gender. This is, to the author’s 
knowledge, the first contribution examining the Sweden Democrats’ framing of gender from 
the creation of the party until now. By comparing the party over time, this study contributes 
to a better understand how the rhetoric regarding gender has developed in the case of the 
Sweden Democrats, but also if the Sweden Democrats fit into this recent trend in Western 
Europe where right-wing populist parties are becoming more mainstream in regards to 
women’s rights (Lancaster, 2019). To understand the framing and the potential re-framing of 
gender is key since the Sweden Democrats have increasingly gained electoral support, and 
are at the same time decreasing its electoral gender gap with a higher percentage of women 
voting for them than before. 
Qualitative text analysis and framing 
This research study examines both the construction of problems (explicit and implicit), the 
attribution of blame for the perceived problem, and the framing of solutions from a gendered 
perspective. The analytical tool of frame analysis is appropriate since the assumption is that 
different societal issues can be framed strategically by political actors. The strategic 
construction of the frames for specific political issues is at the center, not the motives or 
thought-process of the actors constructing them. As in frame theory, the questions in frame 
analysis centers around the framing of the problem, the cause of the perceived problem, and 
the framing of possible solutions to the problem (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019:586; Esaiasson 
et al., 2017:218-219). Following the theoretical framework of frame theory, the following 
analytical questions for coding the material is: 
Diagnostic frames:  
What are the problem/problems perceived to be? 
Who or what is represented as the cause of the perceived problems? 
Prognostic frames:  
What are the solutions to the defined problems?  
How are the solutions or course of action to the perceived problems framed? 
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Operationalization 
It becomes paramount to specify how gender is operationalized, especially since gender is a 
broad theoretical concept, encompassing a broad set of issues. Therefore, it is essential to 
operationalize this concept in accordance with the theoretical definition and relevant 
operational indicators to measure what is intended to achieve validity of this study (Esaiasson 
et al., 2017:58). Reliability refers to the absence of random- or systematic errors (Esaiasson, 
2017:64). To obtain reliability in this study, it is important to be consistent and thorough 
while analyzing the chosen material. To achieve reliability in this study, I will make the study 
available for replication by other scholars by being transparent of how the material is 
analyzed. To provide further transparency, quotations from the material are included. 
This study aims to analyze how the Sweden Democrats have framed gender over time. 
Gender is related to biological sex but focuses on the socially constructed processes, 
presentations, roles, and actions that are not inherently based on the biological sex. Therefore, 
the biological sex constructs gender, femininity, and masculinity that “shapes the accepted, 
expected, and rewarded behavior and preferences based on social constructs, norms, and 
institutions." It is also important to have an approach that identifies the diversity among men 
and women with reference to class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality while still acknowledging 
the social constructs that generally affect women differently to men. An inclusive approach 
also provides the opportunity to examine the construction of homosexuality, a theme 
identified as an increasingly important among some right-wing populist parties in recent 
years (Spierings, Zaslove, Mügge & L. de Lange, 2015:10-11).  
 Furthermore, in line with previous research, this study’s operational indicators for 
gender focuses on the problems and solution constructed in regards to the "nature" of gender 
and gender roles, family politics, gender equality, and the threat from the religious and 
culturally “other.” Since gender and gender-related issues seldom have their own section in 
party programs of right-wing populist parties (Mudde, 2015), the material will be read in its 
entirety and not narrowed down to specific sections. 
Material  
The material chosen for this study is the party programs and election manifestos since the 
establishment of the Sweden Democrats in 1989 and up to the most recent parliamentary 
election of 2018. This study will be able to examine the ways in which problems and 
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solutions regarding gender has been framed over time. The empirical data analyzed in this 
study are the party programs of 1989, 1994, 1996, and 1999 as well as the position paper of 
2003, 2005, and 2011. There have not been any position papers published since 2011, and 
therefore, the election manifestos of 2010, 2014 and 2018 will also be included in the 
analysis. These programs and election manifestos have been retrieved from either the website 
of the Swedish National Data Service (SND) or the official website of the Sweden 
Democrats.  
While I acknowledge the usefulness of examining other types of material, such as 
parliamentary bills, speeches, and statements from individual party members, it does not 
allow for an even comparison over time. This material selection provides for an examination 
of the most polished version of the Sweden Democrats with the most consensus within the 
party, which cannot be dismissed as opinions from the fringe of the party. All empirical 
material analyzed is in Swedish, and all translations are done by the author.  
Findings and Analysis 
My analysis of the Sweden Democrats framing of problems and solutions regarding gender 
shows that there has been a shift in the diagnostic and prognostic frames used over time. In 
the first decade of the party, the diagnostic frames highlighted problems of women being 
forced into the labor market, moral decay in society, and the glorification of the “unhealthy 
homosexual lifestyle,” whereas the solutions presented emphasized a return to traditional 
values. From 2010 and onwards, these constructed problems were replaced by frames of 
gender equality “going too far” and Swedish gender equality under threat from the religious 
and cultural “other” with solutions focusing on removing “extremist” gender equality 
measures and restrict the misogynic practices of the “other.” 
Diagnostic Framing 
Diagnostic frames identify perceived problems and can attribute blame towards individuals, 
groups, or structures as the cause for the perceived problem. In the case of the Sweden 
Democrats, problems regarding gender-related issues are identified. The findings also show 
how the framing of problems regarding gender has been changed and modified over time and 
new diagnostic frames have emerged. 
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From women being forced onto the Labor Market to Parents’ Right to Choose 
In the party program of 1989, one diagnostic frame presents the problem of women being 
forced into the labor market by the Social Democrats. The program of 1989 states that: “The 
anti-family politics of the Social Democrats have contributed to many of society's problems 
of today. Through tax policies, women have been forced into the labor market, which in turn 
has negatively impacted the children. Many children and youths have lost their way by not 
having the safety and the traditional norms parents and families for generations have 
provided their kids.” (SD, 1989:2). The problem identified is that women have entered the 
labor market against their free will, which consequently made children suffer. Female labor 
force participation is constructed as destructive and not in the best interest of the family and 
contrasted to the safety of traditional norms where women stay in the home and the man is 
the breadwinner. The cause of this problem is tax policies implemented by the Social 
Democrats. This statement assumes women's primary roles are that of mothers and 
housewives, which research has identified as a common theme among right-wing populist 
parties (Mudde, 2007). However, the argument that women are being “forced” into the labor 
market is removed from the following official party literature after 1989. The three following 
party programs of 1994, 1996, and 1999 include the same statement of children suffering 
from the lack of traditional norms in the family as it did in 1989, but instead of presenting 
women as housewives pushed out into the workforce, the statement is reframed as “families 
freedom to choose to raise their kids in the home.”  
The family's freedom to choose is stressed in throughout the party literature, 
especially with regard to paternity leave. From 1994 until 2018, paternity leave is presented 
as "restricting the parents right to parenthood" (SD 1994:8; SD 1996:9; SD 1999:9), "forced 
restrictions” (SD, 2010; 2014), and “quota-based parental leave” (SD, 2018:14) and 
consistently framed as restricting family's freedom to choose without state intervention. 
Therefore, the Sweden Democrats have modified its diagnostic framing regarding gender 
roles in family constellations from 1989 where women’s labor participation was constructed 
as “forced” and harmful for children’s upbringing, to a frame that does not explicitly present 
women’s role as housewives. Instead, the Sweden Democrats frame paternal leave as 
intervention undermining parent's freedom to choose. This frame is identified from 1994 until 
2018, making it both consistent and part of the party's current framing. 
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The moral dissolution of Swedish Society 
Another diagnostic frame identified in the party programs between 1989 until 1999 presents 
Swedish society in a state of moral dissolution caused by the traditional parties. The party 
state in the party programs of 1989, 1994, 1996 and 1999 that: “Since the end of the 60s, the 
responsibility of our nation has been in the hands of politicians that have not seen to the best 
and the needs of the Swedish people. Those who have ruled Sweden have, through their 
politics, contributed to the dissolution of guiding ethical and moral principles. The result is 
evident in different ways, such as high criminality, divorces, broken homes, abortions, and 
low Swedish birthrates.” (SD 1989:2; SD 1994:3; SD 1996:3; SD 1999:1).  
 This perceived problem of “moral dissolution” is explicitly tied to family-related 
issues, women’s reproductive rights, and the fertility of Swedish women. Research has shown 
that right-wing populist parties, in many cases, tend to view issues such as divorces 
negatively and wanting to prohibit abortions (Mudde, 2007). This pattern is evident in the 
first ten years of the party, where these issues, along with low Swedish birthrates, are 
explicitly framed as problems due to a moral decay in Swedish society. The blame of this 
perceived problem of moral dissolution, resulting in abortions, divorces, and low Swedish 
birthrates, is allocated to the ruling politicians since the 1960s. The ideologies of these 
politicians are presented as infiltrated by "internationalism" causing: “honorable concepts 
such as the nation, the family, and the individual to be dragged through the mud.” (SD, 
1989;1994:3;1996:3;1999:1).  
 The problem of abortions and low Swedish birthrates is further emphasized in the first 
four party programs of 1989, 1994, 1996, and 1999. The Sweden Democrats present abortion 
in general as a problem, but also highlight the perceived problem that the majority of women 
having abortions are Swedish. The party program of 1994 states that the numbers of abortions 
are "...Scandalously high, almost at the same level as the mass immigration, and it is mainly 
Swedish women that are having abortions.” (SD, 1994:11). The diagnostic framing of the 
problem here is twofold: abortion itself, and also that native women are primarily having 
them. This statement ties into the most central issue among right-wing populist parties of 
anti-immigration, by comparing the number of abortions with the level of “mass 
immigration.”  
The importance of “Swedish” fertility is further emphasized in the party program of 
1996, stating that: “The fact that friends of the motherlands primarily are having a family 
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with other Swedish partners, or secondly with partners from a western culture, is not racist.” 
(SD, 1996:12). This statement shows that these constructed problems regarding lacking 
traditional family values and gender roles are connected to ethnic homogeneity, where family 
creation ought to be between Swedes or other people from western cultures. As previous 
research shown (Norocel, 2013), the Sweden Democrats emphasize the role of Swedish 
women in generating “Swedish offspring.” The emphasis on “Swedish family creation” and 
the problem of “Swedish women having abortions” evident in the party programs of the first 
decade ties into the construction of native women as instrumental to the “survival of the 
nation” in which women’s primary role is to be a mother and facilitate their reproductive 
capabilities to ensure the continued existence of the nation (Mudde, 2007). 
Since 2003, the frame of moral dissolution caused by politicians since the 1960s is 
removed from the official party literature. Neither is divorces, broken homes, and low 
Swedish birthrates presented as problems or tied to ethnic homogeneity. However, there are 
still implicit anti-abortion sentiments. The construction of the problem is altered, and abortion 
as a concept is not used anymore, instead stating that: “In our Sweden, there are no unwanted 
children” (SD, 2010) or stating that traditional ideologies view on the human essence, such as 
liberalism and socialism, leads to the wrongful conclusion that: “A human fetus, based on the 
assumed lack of unique characteristics, is totally worthless.” (SD, 2011:7-8). Even though 
abortion is less salient over the last 17 years, and no longer connected to Swedish women’s 
role as mothers and the “survival of the nation,” abortion itself is still framed as a problem 
which is allowed to go on due to liberalism and socialism’s wrongful assumptions about 
human life. 
As previous research outlined, right-wing populist parties tend to emphasize 
traditional gender roles and connect women’s issues to issues of the family (Mudde, 2007; 
Akkerman, 2015). This emphasis is prevalent in the earlier party programs from 1989 until 
1999. These presented problems in the first four party programs of moral dissolution in 
Swedish society, women being “forced” into the labor market, divorces, abortions, and low 
Swedish birthrates shows a nostalgia to return to traditional values, common among right-
wing populist parties (Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019). During the 1990s, the perceived problem 
of abortions and low Swedish birthrates are also tied to the Sweden Democrat's core political 
issue of anti-immigration, comparing the number of abortions to "mass immigration" and 
stressing ethnic homogeneous family creation to ensure "Swedish offspring." From 2003, the 
diagnostic frame of moral dissolution is removed, and issues such as divorces, broken homes, 
Swedish birthrates are onwards not constructed as problems. However, abortion is still 
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framed as a problem. In 2011, abortion is still constructed as a problem, where liberalism and 
socialism are blamed for perceiving a fetus as "worthless." 
The glorification of the “unhealthy homosexual lifestyle” 
Furthermore, the findings show that homosexuality is diagnostically framed as sexual deviant 
and glorified by the mass media in the late 1990s. Homosexuality is first mentioned in the 
programs of 1996 and 1999 and referred to as “sexually deviant.” While stating that “No 
person chooses their sexual orientation. Harassment towards sexual deviants are criminal acts 
and ought to be punished.” (SD, 1996:9; SD, 1999:9) it is followed by “outlet of sexual 
deviants can take place as long as no one suffers. The glorification of the homosexual 
lifestyle among the mass media creates unhealthy frames of reference for young people 
building their adult identity.” Being gay is presented as deviant, but tolerated if not 
“glorified.” Here, the mass media is blamed for “glorifying” gays with concern of how it will 
possibly corrupt the minds of the youth.  
This frame of the unhealthy homosexual lifestyle found in the party programs of 1996 
and 1999 has been removed when the issue reappears in the party program of 2011. 
Homosexuality is no longer diagnostically framed as "sexually deviant," and the mass media 
are no longer blamed for the "glorification" of the "unhealthy homosexual lifestyle." Instead, 
they state: "In the same way most people inherit gender, we also regard sexual orientation as 
something most people are born with. We oppose doctrines claiming that sexual orientation is 
only a social construction." (SD, 2011:25). Here, sexuality is presented as something "most 
people" are born with, leaving room for other factors. However, they also reject the 
“doctrines” that only view sexuality as socially constructed. These doctrines and which actors 
who are promoting this view are, however, not explained further to identify any allocation of 
blame.  
Previous research (Moffitt, 2017) identified the trend among some right-wing populist 
parties in Northern Europe to present gay rights as a national value that needs protection from 
the culturally “other.” The Sweden Democrats, however, do not frame gay rights as a national 
value threatened by the immigrated "Pre-modern other." They have merely removed the 
frame identified in the programs of the late 1990s where homosexuality is sexually deviant 
and not something the mass media should "glorify" to the impressionable youth to a more 
neutral wording in 2011.  
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Gender Equality gone too far 
Another diagnostic frame identified constructs the problem of individual’s freedom 
undermined by gender equality gone too far. Gender equality as a concept was non-existent 
in the party programs of the Sweden Democrats until 2003. In the programs of 2003 and 
2005, they state that: “It is central for the Sweden Democrats that all people, regardless of 
gender, have the same rights and possibilities.” (SD, 2003:5; SD, 2005:8). However, there is 
no framing of problems or solutions related to this statement. Gender equality as a term is 
non-existent until the election manifesto of 2010, where the concept is dedicated its own 
section in the manifesto. The party state that: “In our Sweden, it is self-evident that men and 
women have the same worth and rights.” (SD, 2010:6). However, their conception of gender 
equality is also contrasted with other actors in Sweden, which are framed as problematic 
since they want to remove any differences between men and women. In the election 
manifesto of 2018, they state that: “In the public debate regarding gender equality, the 
emphasis is often put on the unequal distribution between men and women. Other parties 
want to micromanage how families should divide the paternal leave, how many men and 
women work in certain fields or control businesses. For the Sweden Democrats, gender 
equality is about solving the problems that are unequal, rather than distribute them equally 
between gender.” (SD, 2018:18).  
This frame that other parties are removing the right to self-determination in the name 
of gender equality is also evident in the election manifesto of 2014. In the election manifesto 
of 2014, they state that in the section named “gender equality for the real people” that the 
Sweden Democrats are working towards: “A Sweden where the government is not trying to 
control men’s and women’s gender identity and life choices, but instead support the citizens 
in the choices they have made and in the situation they are.” (SD, 2014:17). Therefore, in the 
last eight years, a new diagnostic frame has emerged, where the people’s right to determine 
their lives are presented as undermined by other parties and governments due to their 
misconceptions of "real" gender equality. As Moffitt (2017) argues, the rhetoric used by 
many right-wing populist parties present other parties' course of action to achieve gender 
equality as a form of discrimination and as forcing men and women to be the same.  
This frame of “gender equality gone too far” can be explained by the Sweden 
Democrats' assumptions of the biological differences between men and women. In the 
position papers of 2003 and 2005, these biological differences between men and women are 
distinguished. The party states that: “Men and women are not created the same and can, 
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therefore, approach different situations in different ways and do different things in different 
ways. Men and women complement each other, and therefore, it is an essential right for all 
children to have one mother and one father.” (SD, 2003:5; SD, 2005:8). The party continues 
to stress these “natural” differences in the position paper of 2011, stating that: “These 
inherited qualities that link a certain group of people, but not all of humanity, in addition to 
the socially constructed differences we acknowledge, are the biological differences between 
most women and most men above what can be observed by the naked eye. In a society where 
people can shape their lives freely, these differences will most likely result in differences in 
preferences, behavior, and life choices.” (SD, 2011:8). The wording has been modified from 
2003 and 2005 to also acknowledge the social construction of gender. However, the 
construction of the differences between the sexes is still emphasizing that men and women 
are created differently, having certain "inherited qualities," which will lead to "natural" 
differences in their actions and goals. As Mulinari (2016) argued, the Sweden Democrats still 
seem to have a difficult relationship with gender equality, stemming from their assumptions 
of the natural differences between the sexes. However, these findings show that even though 
the Sweden Democrats might be contradictory in their gender ideology, their usage of gender 
equality rhetoric shows a rather consistent way of constructing a problem of “gender equality 
going too far.” 
The cultural and religious other threatening Swedish Gender Equality 
Another key diagnostic frame identified is the construction of Islam as misogynic. The 
diagnostic framing of Islam as a threat to women is first expressed in the party program of 
1999, regarding prohibiting mosques and minarets in Sweden. The party state: “Islam is not 
only a religious movement, but also have social and political ambitions that we deem not 
desirable in Sweden. For example, we find Islam's views on women and animals 
unacceptable." (SD, 1999:5). This statement is the first framing of Islam as a problem in 
regards to its misogynic views. As identified by previous research (Brubaker, 2017; Wodak, 
2013; Moffitt, 2017), this connection between gender and the perceived threat from other 
"misogynic cultures" such as Islam has been increasing over the last 15 years. The time frame 
of this trend helps explain why it is identified only once in the party program of 1999 but 
increase in salience in the 2010s. 
The frame of the perceived misogynic “other” reappears in the election manifesto of 
2010. In the section named “Gender Equality and increased safety for the country’s women," 
they state that: "In our Sweden, it is self-evident that men and women have the same worth 
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and rights. There is no space for misogynist religions and ideologies in our Sweden. In our 
Sweden, both men and women should feel safe, respected, and fairly treated.” (SD, 2010:6). 
The party presents the “gender-equal Sweden” where it is self-evident that men and women 
have the same value and rights, whereas the “misogynist ideologies and religions” are the 
identified problem since they do not share these Swedish values. This statement does not 
identify any specific ideology or religion as in 1999 when Islam was explicitly framed as 
misogynic. However, taken together with other statements from the manifesto, Islam is still 
implicitly framed as the scapegoat. In their solutions regarding immigration policy, they 
present the proposals of: "An increased support to women that live in religious and honor-
related oppression in Sweden," "Stopping the Islamization of Swedish society." and "Prohibit 
full-covered veils in public places.” (SD, 2010:4).  
Since Islam, or rather "Islamization," is the only religion presented as a problem in the 
manifesto, it is implied to be the "misogynic religions" Sweden does not have room for. 
Furthermore, the solution of increased support to women living in religious and honor-based 
oppression is presented as explicitly linked to immigration, where a foreign religion is 
oppressing immigrant women. Therefore, immigrant women are framed as needing 
“liberation” from the oppressive practices of foreign religions. This framing is further 
emphasized with the proposal of banning the full veil in public places. As a whole, Islam is 
framed as oppressive towards immigrant women and not compatible with "gender-equal 
Sweden," in line with previous research (Moffitt, 2017; Wodak, 2013; Towns et al., 2014). 
 This framing of the “misogynic other” is also evident and expanded upon in the 
manifestos of 2014 and 2018 and the position paper of 2011. While Sweden is presented as 
“one of the most gender-equal countries in the world." (SD, 2018:18), the problems presented 
in regards to other cultures and religions are more salient in the material. The presented 
problem of honor-based violence and oppression is expanded upon to identify several 
connected issues, such as the full covered veil, female mutilation (SD, 2011; SD, 2014; SD, 
2018), and forced marriages (SD, 2014; SD, 2018). These problems are connected to other 
cultures. For example, regarding female mutilation: “The expanded practice of female 
mutilation in some countries is an example of such a destructive aspect. We hope that the 
countries practicing this barbaric custom chose to abolish it and that they settle the score with 
the misogynic attitudes the custom is based on.” (SD, 2011:20). These issues are 
distinguished between “we” as champions for women’s rights and “them” with their 
“barbaric” customs and misogynic views. The cause of these presented problems is the 
misogynic views held by the culturally other. In 2014, it is also implied that the ruling 
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government is economically supporting violent and misogynic religious groups. The Sweden 
Democrats proposing that: “Pull all state-subsidies towards all political and religious 
organizations that are advocating or legitimizing violence or any discrimination of 
individuals on the basis of their gender.” (SD, 2014:17). 
A noteworthy aspect is how the framing of the misogynic “other” has developed over 
time from simply stating that Islam is misogynic in 1999, to a reframing during the last ten 
years. Islam is still a scapegoat for misogyny, but in the last ten years, this perceived 
misogyny is explicitly presented as threatening Swedish gender equality. The presented 
problems have expanded since 2010 to a specific set of issues, such as honor-based violence, 
female mutilation, and forced marriages. One way for right-wing populist parties to gain 
more electoral support is to present themselves as “legitimate” and supporting national values 
(Halikiopoulou, Mock & Vasilopoulou, 2013). This strategy can help explain both the 
increased emphasis of “gender-equal Sweden” that was non-existent in the first decade of the 
party. Most Swedes (82 %) are in favor of increasing gender equality (Pew, 2019a) and a 
majority (68 %) is positive to Muslims in Sweden (Pew, 2019b), which might help explain 
why the Sweden Democrats have made gender equality salient in their party literature in the 
last decade while the most blatant framing of Islam as misogynic was reframed in more 
implicit terms. Instead, the reframing of the cultural other has problematized specific issues 
in line with general national values, such as a ban of the full-covered veil in public, which 64 
% of Swedes are in favor of (Politologerna, 2018). 
These findings are in line with previous studies of the Sweden Democrats (Towns et 
al., 2014) showing that the party has framed the culturally and religious "other" as misogynic. 
My findings, however, show that this frame was not evident until the end of the 1990s, which 
fits with the broader trend in Western Europe identifying this rhetoric as prevalent in the last 
15 years (Brubaker, 2017), and increasing in salience among right-wing populist parties 
(Moffitt, 2017; Akkerman & Haglund 2007). In the case of the Sweden Democrats, the frame 
identified in 1999 construct Islam as misogynic, but this frame is not salient in other party 
literature from the 1990s and 2000s. From 2010 and onwards, however, the framing of the 
perceived misogynic practices and values from other cultures are more salient. The culturally 
“other” is put in contrast to Swedish values of gender equality, which needs protection from 
barbaric practices from other cultures. Instead of blaming the whole religion of Islam, they 
have reframed the problem into specific practices, which are explained as based on “others” 
misogynic attitudes, without circling out Islam or Muslim immigrants explicitly. However, it 
is implied, by proposing a halt to the “Islamization” of Swedish society right in between the 
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proposals of banning the full-covered veil and the problematization of honor-related 
oppression of immigrant women. The blame is also allocated at the Swedish government, 
presented as facilitating these misogynic “others” with state-subsidies. 
Since 2010, gender equality as a concept became salient in the official party literature 
of the Sweden Democrats. While stressing the importance of gender equality regarding 
immigration but critic it in other areas are ideologically contradictory (Towns et al., 2014), 
frame analysis instead allows to show two consistent diagnostic frames where gender equality 
is instrumentalized to construct distinct problems caused by other parties and the mere 
presence of the cultural “other.” 
Prognostic Framing 
Prognostic frames present solutions or a course of action to deal with the problems 
constructed through the diagnostic frames. 
The right to stay at home with children 
The solution to the problem of women being forced into the labor market is presented later in 
the party program of 1989. The party states that: “The Sweden Democrats believe that the 
mother (or another legal guardian) should have the right to stay at home with full-pay during 
the child’s first three years. Thereafter, the home-staying parent shall receive a benefit until 
the child starts school.” (SD, 1989:8). As research has shown, mothers are often portrayed as 
the primary stay-at-home parent (Mudde, 2007) in their role as “nurturing mothers" (Towns 
et al., 2014). To facilitate the possibility for mothers to stay at home, the proposal provides 
economic solutions. Even though the argument that women are being forced into the labor 
market is removed after 1989, the following programs of 1994, 1996 and 1999 continue to 
stress the importance to return to traditional stay-at-home work, stating that: “Tax policies 
must be formulated to encourage family formation also for citizens with low incomes” (SD, 
1989:7; SD, 1994:7; SD, 1996:8, SD, 1999:8) and “Work in the home must be given a higher 
status in order to give our children the best possible upbringing.” (SD, 1989:7; SD, 1994:7). 
Furthermore, the party programs of 1994 and 1996 propose a “parental allowance" to "give 
parents the possibility to raise their children in the home" (SD, 1994:8; SD, 1996:9). These 
solutions emphasize a transformation in tax policies and increased economic incentives for 
stay-at-home work. Even though women are not explicitly presented as housewives after 
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1989, the solutions remain focused on facilitating stay-at-home work on the basis of parents' 
right to choose. 
To facilitate parents' right to choose, The Sweden Democrats oppose paternal leave 
because it “...is to intrude on parent's rights to parenthood” (SD, 1994:8; SD, 1996:9; SD, 
1999:9). This prognostic frame is later modified to oppose restrictions on parental leave in 
general instead of opposing paternal leave specifically. They propose: “A free parental 
insurance without forced restrictions” (SD, 2010:5), “An increased and deregulated parental 
benefit...Our conviction is that the country’s parents are more equipped than politicians to 
decide what is best for their children.” (SD, 2014:14), and “Simplify the life puzzle for 
families by having a parental insurance system without quotas" (SD, 2018:14). This 
modification from 2010 and onwards emphasize parental leave without restrictions, instead of 
solely opposing earmarked days for fathers. 
“Moral armament” of Social Policies 
Regarding the diagnostic frame of moral dissolution identified in the party programs between 
1989 and 1999, the solutions presented focuses on increased restrictions on abortions and 
promoting increased fertility. The party program of 1989 and 1994 both propose the need for 
a "moral armament" and propose prohibition of abortions with exceptions for rape and 
medical reasons. Furthermore, they stress the solutions of information and new family 
policies (SD, 1989:9; SD, 1994:11). These family policies are not specified in that statement; 
However, as shown above, most of their proposals revolve around economic incentives for 
family building. In the party program of 1989, there is also a specific solution in regards to 
increased fertility. The party states that: “The Sweden Democrats want to give tax relief to 
families with children according to a scale where the tax decreases for each child.” (SD, 
1989:8).  
Later programs continue to provide solutions for the perceived problem of abortions. 
In the party program of 1996, the party propose a referendum on the issue of abortion and 
state that they would impose “healthier social policies” (SD, 1996:12). In the party program 
of 1999, the solutions regarding abortions have changed again to the proposal to prohibit 
abortions after week twelve of pregnancy, with the exception for medical reasons (SD, 
1999:15). Even though abortion is framed as a problem later on in the position paper of 2011, 
there are no solutions presented to solve the perceived problem. The solutions to this 
perceived problem have been altered over time, from an almost total ban of abortions in the 
first two programs to not presenting any solutions in 2011. As Norocel (2013) argues, the 
  
26 
Sweden Democrats emphasize family policies and restrictions on abortions. However, these 
findings also show that this prognostic frame is evident in the programs of 1989 and 1994 in 
particular, and is later removed from the official party literature. Abortion is still constructed 
as a problem, but the lack of solutions point to a decreased salience of this issue over time,  
indicating that the Sweden Democrats have softened their traditionalist views, at least in the 
official party literature. 
Promote the nuclear and heterosexual family 
In regards to the Sweden Democrats prognostic framing of the “unhealthy homosexual 
lifestyle,” the solutions centers around the restrictions for non-heterosexual partnerships to 
have families and marry. In the party programs of 1996 and 1999, where gay people are 
presented as "sexual deviant," they propose that: "Registered partnership for homosexuals 
shall not be allowed. The rules of inheritance should only apply to the families based on 
heterosexual monogamy, not other forms of cohabitation such as homosexual couples, 
polygamy, etc. Homosexual couples and polygamous families should not be allowed to 
adopt" (SD, 1996:9 ;SD, 1999:10). Here, it becomes evident that the Sweden Democrat's 
concept of the family, with the possibilities to adopt, inherit from their spouse and legally 
marry, is exclusive to the nuclear family. Other forms of relationships and partnerships, such 
as same-sex couples, does not fit into this construction of the family and should, therefore, 
not have the same possibilities as heterosexual couples. 
The frame of mass media’s glorification of the “unhealthy homosexual lifestyle” has 
been removed in the 2000s and 2010s. However, the policy solutions regarding the family are 
still based on the heterosexual norm. The solutions presented in 2011 still contain limitations 
on other forms of cohabitation. For example, they argue that single people, same-sex couples, 
and polygamous groups should not be able to adopt except for when they are closely related 
to the child. Neither should insemination be allowed for same-sex couples or polygamous 
groups. Same-sex couples should no longer be prohibited from marrying, but it is still 
presented as a decision for the religious congregation in question, not as a universal right 
(SD, 2011). Even though some moderation has been made regarding the Sweden Democrats 
policy solutions, it is evident that heteronormativity, as Norocel (2013) argues, still is the 
basis for the party’s construction of the family unit while other types of partnership and 
cohabitation remain excluded. 
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Real improvements instead of “extreme” gender equality 
Regarding the diagnostic frame identified from 2010 and onwards, where other parties are 
presented as undermining people’s freedom by taking gender equality too far, the solutions 
emphasize the abolishment of unnecessary measures and the need to focus on “real 
problems.” In the election manifesto of 2010, the Sweden Democrats propose the 
abolishment of state substitutes for gender pedagogy. In the election manifesto of 2014, they 
propose that: “Remove state subsidies for the type of gender pedagogy that aims to change all 
children's and youth's behavior and gender identity rather than increase the understanding for 
those individuals that want and need to break out from traditional gender norms." (SD, 
2014:17). In this statement, the government is presented as funding programs aimed at 
“changing” children’s gender identity and behavior and undermining people’s right to self-
determination. This construction of gender equality “going too far” fits with previous 
findings (Mulinari, 2016; Towns et al., 2014) showing that the Sweden Democrats are, except 
regarding immigration issues, opponents of certain measures aiming at further gender 
equality in Sweden.  
In the election manifesto of 2018, they contrast the focus on gender theories with 
what they portray as “real solutions.” They state that: “Instead of gender theories and quotas, 
implement real improvements in the working conditions in the fields of work dominated by 
women…” (SD, 2018:18). Therefore, other parties’ policies, such as gender pedagogy in 
schools, gender theories, and quotas, are not only presented as invalid measures but also 
framed as wrongfully controlling the individual. The prognostic frame of “real 
improvements” regarding gender equality invalidates measures presented as “taking gender 
equality too far” such as gender pedagogy and gender theories and validates their proposal of 
better working conditions in women-dominated work fields. As previous studies have shown, 
the Sweden Democrats still tend to oppose measures they perceive as making men and 
women the same and instrumentalize gender equality in their rhetoric to criticize other gender 
equality measures they deem too “extreme” (Mulinari, 2016). 
Gender, Islam and religious oppression 
The solutions identified regarding the threat from the cultural “other” has expanded 
since it was first identified in the party program of 1999. In 1999, the perceived misogyny of 
Islam called for the prohibition of mosqués and minarets (SD, 1999). The problem of the 
culturally “other” being a threat to women and the solutions to this perceived problem was 
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not mentioned again before 2010. In the election manifesto of 2010 regarding immigration, 
the party propose: “An increased support to women that live in religious and honor-related 
oppression in Sweden," "Stopping the Islamization of Swedish society," and "Prohibit full-
covered veils in public places." (SD, 2010:4). The position paper of 2011 does not propose 
the same specific solutions as in the election manifestos. However, the party propose 
assimilation combined with limited immigration as a solution in regards to immigrants 
coming from countries where the "culture and basic values strongly differ from the Swedish.” 
(SD, 2011:15). A few pages later in the position paper, the party provides an example of such 
a culture, with the problematization of misogynic attitudes resulting in the practice of female 
mutilation (SD, 2011:19-20). As Akkerman and Haglund (2007) argues, right-wing populist 
parties contrast their own culture and values from the "pre-modern other," in which solutions 
of assimilation and stricter immigration policies are presented as necessary protection from 
patriarchal foreign cultures. 
 The election manifestos of 2014 and 2018 mostly call for more restrictions such as: 
“Prohibit full-covered veils in public places.”, “Create a specific classification for honor-
related crime to counteract honor-based oppression, establish an age limit of 24 for marriage 
with foreign citizens…”, “Legislation to prohibit child marriage and polygamy without 
exceptions." (SD, 2018:18), and “Tougher punishments and increased efforts against female 
mutilations, forced marriage, as well as sexual and honor-related violence.” (SD, 2014:17). 
However, a few solutions also are presented in terms of supporting those suffering from these 
problems, such as “Increased support to women helplines, establishing specific hotlines for 
honor-based violence...” (SD, 2014:17) and “....strengthen the health care of genital 
mutilation, and prohibit non-medical circumcision of minors.” (SD, 2018:18). As Wodak 
(2013) argues, the burqa-wearing woman is presented as a representation of the perceived 
danger of Islam. These proposals also highlight the construction of liberating immigrant 
women suffering under their oppressive cultures and religions (Moffitt, 2017). 
Reflection 
The results show several diagnostic and prognostic frames regarding gender in the official 
party literature of the Sweden Democrats. The findings also show change over time, as 
certain frames are altered, modified, and new ones emerge. For an overview, see table 1 
below. 
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Table 1. Overview of frames by years. 
Year Diagnostic Prognostic 
1989 Women forced into labor market 
Moral dissolution 
Economic incentives to be housewives. 
Restrict abortions, new family policies. 
1994 Moral dissolution 
Parents’ right to choose 
Restrict abortions, new family policies. 
Oppose paternal leave. 
1996 Homosexuality glorified 
Moral dissolution 
Parents’ right to choose 
Protect the heteronormative family. 
Restrict abortions. 
Oppose paternal leave. 
1999 Homosexuality glorified 
Moral dissolution 
Parents’ right to choose 
Threat of misogynic Islam 
Protect the heteronormative family. 
Restrict abortions. 
Oppose paternal leave. 
Prohibit mosques/minarets. 
2003 - - 
2005 - - 
2010 Gender equality gone too far 
Gender equality under threat from other 
cultures 
 
Parent’s right to choose 
Abolish state subventions for gender pedagogy. 
Prohibit full-covered veil. 
Stop “Islamization.” 
Increased support for oppressed women. 
Parental leave without restrictions. 
2011 Gender equality under threat from other 
cultures 
- 
Anti-abortion sentiments. 
Assimilation and restrict immigration. from 
distant cultures. 
Protect the heteronormative family. 
- 
2014 Gender equality gone too far 
Gender equality under threat from other 
cultures 
 
 
Parents’ right to choose 
Remove state subsidies for gender pedagogy. 
Prohibit full-covered veil. 
Increased support to oppressed women. 
Tougher laws/restrictions on female mutilation, 
forced marriages, and honor violence 
Parental leave without restrictions. 
2018 Gender equality gone too far 
Gender equality under threat from other 
cultures 
 
 
 
Parent’s right to choose 
Real improvements, not gender theory.  
Prohibit full-covered veil. 
Tougher laws/restrictions on honor-related crime 
and child marriage, age limit for marry a 
foreigner. 
Strengthen health care.   
Parental leave without restrictions. 
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In the first decade of the party, the diagnostic frames identified present the problems of other 
politicians as causing moral dissolution in Swedish society, forcing women into the labor 
market, and the glorification of the “homosexual lifestyle” by the mass media. Even though 
the frame of women being forced into the labor market was removed after 1989 and replaced 
by parent’s right to choose without state intervention, the emphasis was on the return to 
traditional values of the past, with stay-at-home work, increased fertility, and restrictions on 
abortions. Abortion and low Swedish birthrates were also tied to ethnic homogeneity and the 
"survival of the nation", in which family building ought to be between Swedes or within the 
western culture. These problems were removed from the following material. In the case of the 
Sweden Democrats, the party seems to have, along with other Western European right-wing 
populist parties (Lancaster, 2019), softened its traditionalist positions on gender, morality and 
sexuality. The position papers of 2003 and 2005 were short and did not contain either 
diagnostic or prognostic frames identified in earlier or later programs. 
From 2010 and onwards, new diagnostic frames emerged in the party literature of the 
Sweden Democrats. Notably, the new diagnostic frames identified in the last eight years of 
the party involves the concept of gender equality, which was not mentioned in the party 
literature before. The notion of “Swedish gender equality” is constructed and contrasted from 
the cultural “other," which holds misogynic views not welcome in Swedish society. At the 
same time, gender equality is also constructed as “gone too far”, diminishing the natural 
differences between men and women and subsequently undermining individual freedoms.  
Previous studies (Towns et al., 2014; Mulinari, 2016; Norocel, 2013) on the Sweden 
Democrats shows a party with ambiguous gender ideology that criticize gender equality, 
stress the “natural” differences between the sexes, purpose restrictions on women’s 
reproductive rights, while also emphasize gender equality when discussing immigration. 
However, using frame analysis and examine the party over time contributes to a clearer 
picture. These findings show how the Sweden Democrats has altered or removed 
traditionalist frames stressing "the good old days" that was consistent throughout the first ten 
years of the party, and started constructing new frames focusing on gender equality from 
2010 onwards. Even though the frames presented might be contradictory to each other, they 
show a pattern in the problems and solutions regarding gender constructed by the party over 
time, where it becomes evident that a shift has taken place from the inception of the party 
until now.  
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Conclusion 
The resurgence of right-wing populism in Europe has gained much scholarly attention. For a 
long time, these parties have been characterized by a traditional view on gender and family 
values. However, recent studies have shown that right-wing populist parties in Western 
Europe are softening their traditionalism and instead converge to mainstream values on 
women’s rights (Lancaster, 2019). This study aimed to contribute to this area of research by 
examining how and in which ways the Sweden Democrats frame gender, and how the 
framing has changed over time.  
My frame analysis identified, as shown by previous studies of the Swedish Democrats 
(Towns et al., 2014; Norocel, 2013; Mulinari, 2016), that the party’s construction of problems 
and solutions regarding gender entails the emphasis on the natural differences between the 
sexes, favoring the nuclear family, anti-abortion sentiments, and criticizing certain gender 
equality measures while instrumentalizing gender equality as something “Swedish” that 
needs protection from the religious and culturally “other.”  
 I break new ground, however, in showing how the Sweden Democrats construction 
of problems and solutions regarding gender has changed from its inception until 2018. The 
frames of moral dissolution, women being forced into the labor force, and mass media’s 
glorification of sexual deviancy was removed by 2003. These findings fit into the broader 
trend within Western Europe, where right-wing populist parties have decreased the 
importance of conservative values on gender, morality, and sexuality (Lancaster, 2019). From 
2010 until the most recent election manifesto of 2018, frames regarding gender equality 
became salient, highlighting how measures taken towards gender equality was, on the one 
hand, going too far and diminishing natural differences between men and women, and on the 
other hand, is under threat from misogynic practices from the "culturally other." This shows a 
shift in the Sweden Democrat's framing of gender, from emphasizing the need to return to 
traditional gender roles and family values towards highlighting gender equality. As shown by 
Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou (2013), some right-wing populist parties are 
adopting "liberal" values to gain legitimacy and votes. This has been the case in this study of 
the Sweden Democrats, by removing their most traditional frames to separate from their past, 
and adopting new ones to seem more legitimate. 
However, this shift from traditional frames of morality, gender roles, and sexuality 
towards frames of gender equality does not indicate that the Sweden Democrats have become 
progressive in gender-related issues. The findings instead shows that the Sweden Democrats 
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of today have adapted their rhetoric and instrumentalized frames of gender equality for their 
anti-immigration message, while constructing the perceived problem that gender equality has 
“gone too far.” 
Since this study has focused on one right-wing populist party over time, more 
research needs to be done to examine the evolution of gender and right-wing populism to 
draw generalized conclusions. Therefore, future research could benefit from conducting 
comparative studies of this evolution of gender and gender-specific issues among right-wing 
populist parties across countries to better understand the resurgence of right-wing populism 
from a gendered perspective. This perspective adds an important dimension to our 
understanding of how right-wing populist parties are evolving in their rhetoric to not fall back 
into the political fringe. 
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Appendix 1  
Coding Scheme  
1. Get familiar with the material. Read the texts one time without making any notes or 
coding.  
2. Read the texts thoroughly several times, using the analytical questions designed in the 
method section, looking at both explicit and implicit meanings.  
3. Code the material using frame theory. Coding D for diagnostic frames. Code P for 
prognostic framing, where the material present solutions or course of action of the 
framed problem.  
 
 
 
 
